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Abstract 
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) has often been studied, alongside variables such as 
fundamentalism and orthodoxy, in research analysing the links between religiosity and 
prejudice.  The present paper analyses four concerns regarding this research that arise from 
the relationship of RWA to religiosity variables.  These issues include: an overlap within the 
RWA scale of measures of religiosity and prejudice; inflating relationships by correlating 
part-whole measures; emphasising covariation in the extremes of the construct and hiding the 
possible independence of components within RWA; and statistical artefacts arising from the 
combination of these factors when applied in multiple regression.  We elaborate these four 
issues and then demonstrate how they can lead to different interpretations of some previously 
published data.  The paper concludes with suggestions for the management and resolution of 
these issues that may allow RWA to continue to be used in religiosity and prejudice research 
and how it might evolve to become the boon to researchers that they seek. 
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Religion, prejudice and authoritarianism: 
Is RWA a boon or bane to the psychology of religion?  
 
The possible link between religiosity and prejudice has long been a concern in the 
scientific study of religion.  Most reviews (e.g., Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993; 
Donahue 1985; Gorsuch and Aleshire 1974; Gorsuch 1988; Hunsberger 1995) trace this 
concern back at least as far as Gordon Allport (1950; Allport and Ross 1967).  The 
fundamental paradox of religion and prejudice is that some forms of religion that preach 
brotherly love are associated with more prejudice rather than less (Hall, Matz, and Wood 
2010).  Since Allport's distinction between mature and immature religion, many constructs 
have been suggested to resolve this contradiction.  Over that 60-year period, researchers have 
tried to identify the kind of religious people that give religion a bad name.  Whether they be 
immature, extrinsic, fundamentalist or low in quest orientation, the goal has been to identify 
forms of religion associated with prejudice and distinguish them from forms of religion which 
are not (e.g., Herek 1987; Hunsberger 1995; Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Kirkpatrick 
1993; McFarland 1989).   
In this search, the constructs of fundamentalism (e.g., Herek 1987; Kirkpatrick 1993; 
McFarland 1989) and authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996) have emerged as 
particularly important (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Laythe et 
al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Wylie and Forest 1992).  However the 
relationships between authoritarianism and various forms of religiosity, and between these 
constructs and measures of prejudice, are both theoretically and empirically complex.   
Gorsuch (1984)  argued that issues arising from the measurement of constructs were 
both a boon and a bane in the psychology of religion.  Kirkpatrick and Hood focused these 
conceptual and measurement concerns on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, asking if it 
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continued to be a boon or had become a bane to researchers (Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990).  
We extend this tradition of reflecting upon the role of emerging constructs of importance.  We 
argue that a failure to recognise conceptual and measurement complexities with the use of 
right-wing authoritarianism in research on religiosity and prejudice has led to methodological, 
and statistical problems.  After describing these problems in broad terms, we then provide 
concrete illustrations based on the data from Laythe and colleagues (2002).  We will show 
how the problems we highlight here change the interpretation of the data in fundamental 
ways, and then offer an alternative way of approaching the analysis which we believe offers 
more promise for future research. 
To summarize the arguments to follow: (1) Right-wing authoritarianism is a composite 
construct, with distinct components that are, in themselves, of interest to researchers in the 
study of religion and prejudice.  In using the overall construct of right-wing authoritarianism 
there is a very real danger of hiding the connections of interest, which are buried within the 
scale, rather than illuminating them. (2) Correlating measures that represent part-whole 
relationships is misleading.  The correlations between the RWA scale and independent 
measures of fundamentalism, attitudes to homosexuality, sexual conservatism, or attitudes to 
women are misleading because these constructs are also measured within the RWA scale, 
confounding method variance with theoretical causation.  (3) RWA is measured as a 
continuous dimension, but sometimes discussed in terms of types (such as high 
authoritarians).  As a measure of the covariation of three components, RWA is best defined 
for high-scorers and low-scorers, who are high or low on all components respectively.  Those 
who score more moderately on the scale may have a more complex set of inter-relations 
among the components in which the inter-relations among the components may qualify the 
relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice.  Such possibilities are over-looked in 
authoritarianism research that rhetorically focuses on high or low authoritarians.. 
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Furthermore, such a rhetorical focus can lead researchers to pursue an asymmetric focus on 
one end of the spectrum rather than the other (Martin 2001). (4) These problems are 
compounded further when statistically controlling for one or more related scales, such as 
fundamentalism, in multiple regression and structural equation modelling.  This may lead to 
attempts to interpret as meaningful what are actually statistical artefacts. One example of this 
is where fundamentalism appears to be an inhibitor of prejudice when authoritarianism is 
statistically controlled. We will consider this problem in some detail below because it 
highlights the dangers of not adequately dealing with the construct complexity of RWA. 
Illuminating or Hiding Relationships? 
As defined by Altemeyer (1996), right-wing authoritarianism represents the covariation 
of three attitude clusters: authoritarian submission; authoritarian aggression; and 
conventionalism.  It is the inclusion of the conventionalism cluster in the construct definition 
of authoritarianism that causes the most difficulty for researchers in the social psychology of 
religion and prejudice. This cluster represents adherence to a variety of social conventions 
that are themselves of direct interest to researchers in this domain. To quote Altemeyer, 
"Within each religion, authoritarians tend to be fundamentalists, wishing to maintain the 
beliefs, teachings, and services in their traditional form and resisting change" (Altemeyer 
1996 p 11).  The conventionalism cluster also includes attitudes towards sex, nudity and 
homosexuality, as well as traditional attitudes towards the roles of men and women.   
The relationships between authoritarianism, fundamentalism, and attitudes towards 
sexuality in general, homosexuality, and gender relations, are matters of empirical interest in 
themselves. Although the existence of the conventionalism attitude cluster, together with 
authoritarian submission and aggression, is important for conceptual work within the right-
wing authoritarianism literature, putting all these elements together hides that which we 
would like to illuminate in the study of prejudice, and of religion: the conditions when 
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religiosity, prejudice, and conventional values will co-vary, versus when they may be 
independent or negatively inter-related.  Put simply, the theoretical literature on right-wing 
authoritarianism and the scale measurement itself both assume underlying positive 
correlations between fundamentalism, rejection of non-traditional sex norms including 
homosexuality, and authoritarian aggression and submission.  This is in contrast to the 
literature on religiosity and prejudice, which seeks to identify and understand the conditions 
under which these links are not significant or even significantly negative. 
Correlating Part-Whole Measures 
The complex nature of the authoritarianism scale not only has implications for 
conceptual understandings of religiosity and prejudice, but has also led to problematic 
interpretations of statistical analyses involving authoritarianism, fundamentalism, racism and 
attitudes to homosexuality, in which a composite scale for authoritarianism is used to predict 
attitudes that are also part of the larger construct. For example, right-wing authoritarianism 
has been used to predict attitudes towards homosexuality (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 
1992; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Haslam and Levy 2006; Wylie and Forest 1992; 
Rowatt et al. 2006;  see Whitley and Lee 2000). Since measurement of the conventionalism 
cluster within RWA includes attitude towards homosexuality (e.g., items such as “Gays and 
lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else” (R)), it is hardly surprising to see high 
correlations between RWA and attitudes to homosexuality (Whitley and Lee 2000).  
Similarly, the correlation between RWA and fundamentalism is distorted by the presence of 
religiosity items within the RWA scale (e.g., “People should pay less attention to the Bible 
and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance and instead develop their own 
personal standards of what is moral and immoral” (R)).   
Altemeyer (1996, 2007) has argued that this inclusion in the scale is not sufficient to 
explain the correlations between authoritarianism and fundamentalism, since many other 
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types of items in the full scale also demonstrate this relationship. We agree that the constructs 
of fundamentalism and authoritarianism are likely to be related.  We would not expect that the 
correlation between these measures would be reduced to zero if the overlap in construct 
measurement was eliminated, but we do argue that the overlap means that the empirical 
relationship between existing measures is artificially inflated by an unknown amount. It is 
misleading to compare these correlations of RWA, fundamentalism, and prejudice with those 
of other measures (e.g., quest orientation) that do not include such items.  The overlap 
conflates theoretical causal relations (in which authoritarianism causes prejudice) with 
construct definition (in which authoritarianism is prejudice).  More pragmatically, the overlap 
inflates zero-order correlations, and distorts partial correlations for other independent 
variables, which contributes to the problems we will explore below. 
Independence of the three dimensions? 
RWA is described in terms of three correlated attitudinal clusters: aggression, 
submission, and conventionalism. High scorers on the overall dimension must, by definition, 
be high on all three clusters.  Likewise, low scorers must be low on all three clusters.  High 
and low scorers can therefore be described in a fairly unambiguous way, and researchers 
interested in the authoritarianism construct can find it useful to examine the attitudes and 
behaviours of these well-defined types at the extremes.  In this context, it seems very 
reasonable to refer to “high authoritarians” (e.g., Altemeyer 2004; but see Martin 2001).   
In understanding the continuous relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice, a 
different set of issues apply because most of the variability in studies using the RWA scale is 
not in the extremes.  Since the majority of respondents tend to fall closer to the middle of the 
scale, there is an inherent ambiguity in interpretation.  A moderate score on the scale may 
represent moderate responses to all items, or high scores on some items and low scores on 
others, and all patterns in between.  While this is true of all scales at the item level, it becomes 
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more important when a scale is constructed from potentially meaningful sub-components such 
as aggression, submission, and conventionalism. It becomes meaningful to ask whether a 
moderate scorer on RWA is moderate across the board, or high on one cluster, and low on 
another (Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Funke 2005). Although the right-wing authoritarianism 
scale has been shown to have quite high reliability overall (.85-.88), the average inter-item 
correlation is around .18 (Altemeyer 1996) leaving plenty of capacity for variation in position 
on the different attitude clusters.  The theoretical implication is that if clusters vary in their 
relationship to prejudice or other dependent variables of interest as well as to each other, the 
ability to detect and interpret RWA-prejudice relationships is degraded or distorted. 
Thus, there are three related issues with the RWA scale that form the foundation for the 
more complex statistical problem we will discuss below.  RWA is defined in terms of three 
attitudinal clusters, which are treated as part of a unitary construct, but elements within the 
construct may be of separate interest to researchers in the psychology of religion and 
prejudice.  Those researchers therefore find themselves relating RWA to these constructs of 
interest such as fundamentalism and homosexual prejudice, creating the problem of relating 
part of a scale (e.g., fundamentalism and homosexual prejudice) to the whole scale (the global 
RWA measure), inflating relationships by an unknown amount.  This problem is then 
compounded by the tendency to speak of high or low authoritarians, overlooking responses in 
the middle of the scale where relative differences in component scores are highly likely. 
Taken together, these three issues create a context in which attempts by researchers to include 
RWA in their investigations lead to statistical problems that become evident when using 
multiple regression analysis or structural equation modelling.  
Multiple Regression and Statistical Artefact 
A serious problem arises in analyses that attempt to partial out right-wing 
authoritarianism from fundamentalism.  As the right-wing authoritarianism scale also includes 
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fundamentalism items, the same part-whole problem occurs here as it does in predicting 
attitudes towards homosexuality. However, additional interpretation problems arise when 
attempting to statistically control for variables from this part-whole relationship.  A potential 
statistical artefact occurs when the dependent variable (such as racism) is primarily related to 
one component of authoritarianism (such as authoritarian aggression) while the variable being 
controlled (fundamentalism) is primarily related to another component (conventionalism).  
These problems remain hidden when interpretation is based on correlations with the full 
RWA scale, (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992), or when many other predictors are also 
included in a regression model (e.g., Wylie and Forest 1992).  The potentially counter-
intuitive nature of the results is invisible within this type of analysis, lost in a more complex 
picture. 
However, Laythe and colleagues (2001) conducted a study in which they focused on 
RWA and fundamentalism as the predictors of homosexual prejudice and racism.  The authors 
also re-analysed this subset of variables from Wylie and Forest (1992), and Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger (1992) in the same regression model.  This analysis, we argue, provides a clear 
context in which to demonstrate the impact of model specification and method variance. We 
will, therefore, discuss these findings in some detail to illustrate the issues we have raised. 
Laythe and colleagues (2001) specify a model in which fundamentalism and 
authoritarianism are predictors of racial prejudice and attitudes to homosexuality.  All of these 
scales were moderately to highly positively correlated in their Study 1.  In particular, 
fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism were correlated above .7, and both of these 
predictors correlated about .5 with attitudes to homosexuality. When entered in a multiple 
regression, authoritarianism had a beta weight of .37 while fundamentalism had a beta of .21, 
suggesting that both predict increased prejudice, but that RWA is a more important predictor 
of homosexual prejudice than fundamentalism. With regard to racial prejudice, 
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authoritarianism had a positive beta weight of.52 and fundamentalism had a negative beta 
weight of -.32. The authors were led by this pattern of results to suggest that fundamentalism 
might inhibit racial prejudice if authoritarianism could be controlled. 
Laythe and colleagues (2001) go on to analyse two additional data sets based on 
previously published studies (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Wylie and Forest 1992) and 
find similar patterns, in particular that fundamentalism appeared to have a beta weight 
implying a reduction in racial prejudice after controlling for RWA.  In these latter studies, the 
zero-order correlations between fundamentalism and racism were positive, .27 and .30 
respectively, and the path weights from fundamentalism to racism when RWA was controlled 
were negative, -.31 and -.11 respectively.  Laythe and colleagues were particularly struck by 
the consistent negative coefficient between fundamentalism and racial prejudice after 
controlling RWA in all three reported data sets, and argued that the consistency showed that 
this was a real effect in need of explanation.  They subsequently offer an explanation based on 
the role of orthodoxy as a component of fundamentalism (Laythe et al. 2002). 
However, Mavor, Macleod, Boal and Louis (2009) offer an alternative explanation of 
these findings consistent with the statistical concerns described in the present paper.  The 
authors note that statistical negative suppression can arise in any regression analysis when the 
overlapping variance between two predictors is larger than the variance shared with the 
outcome measure (see Maassen and Bakker 2001).  Suppression can occur for many valid 
reasons, but what makes it likely to be an artefact in this case is the cause of the overlap 
between the predictors: 
“…although fundamentalism has relevant information in common with racial 
prejudice, this is smaller than the shared information between RWA and 
fundamentalism that is irrelevant to the prediction of racial prejudice. We argue 
that the shared information between RWA and fundamentalism that is irrelevant 
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to the prediction of racial prejudice is due to the overlap between 
fundamentalism and the conventionalism component of RWA. If this is the 
case, then the negative suppression effect is a statistical artefact …” (Mavor et 
al. 2009 p. 593-594).   
Using a shorter form of the RWA scale that has been divided into subscales (Smith and 
Winter 2002), Mavor and colleagues (2009) report several findings from an independent data 
set linking fundamentalism, RWA and prejudice that are consistent with our arguments here.  
In their analyses, the conventionalism scale correlated more highly with fundamentalism than 
with the other components of RWA, and this pattern occurs at the item level as well. In terms 
of construct validity, then, it is more plausible to argue that conventionalism is part of 
fundamentalism than to argue that conventionalism is part of RWA.  Second, using an RWA 
scale representing the three components alongside fundamentalism in a regression analysis to 
predict racial and homosexual prejudice, there was a negative path from fundamentalism to 
racial prejudice, and stronger prediction of homosexual prejudice by RWA.  But using only 
the RWA aggression sub-scale alongside fundamentalism, the same level of variance in the 
outcome measures was predicted (there was no drop in predictive power), and the beta weight 
from fundamentalism to racial prejudice became positive (more consistent with the zero-order 
correlation).  In addition, the correlation between the predictors dropped substantially, as the 
reanalysis using the aggression component alone eliminated the overlapping method variance 
of full RWA and fundamentalism that was unrelated to the outcome variable.  Extrapolating 
from their new data set, Mavor and colleagues argue that the original findings by Laythe and 
colleagues (2001) may be a result of statistical artefact arising from the overlap between 
RWA and measures of fundamentalism. 
We illustrate another way of understanding this problem in Figure 1 that focuses our 
attention on the complexity of the RWA construct as the source of the artefact.  We will focus 
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on the regression path from fundamentalism to racism, controlling for RWA, labelled by 
roman numerals (i - v).  The regression path represents the effect on racism of changes in the 
fundamentalism measure, while holding the RWA score constant.  We stress that RWA is held 
constant because this is inherent in the mathematical structure of multiple regression analysis: 
the beta weight for one independent variable represents the change in standardised score of 
the dependent variable associated with a rise of one standard deviation in the value of the 
independent variable while holding the other predictors in the model constant.  Thus, if 
prejudice is regressed onto fundamentalism and RWA, the coefficient for fundamentalism 
represents the impact of changes in that variable on prejudice if the total RWA score stays the 
same.  
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
At step (i) we note that the fundamentalism variable rises by one standard deviation.  
Since there is also a fundamentalism measure in the conventionalism component of RWA, we 
expect that, on average, conventionalism will rise, though by a smaller amount due to 
measurement error (ii).  We assume that other elements of the conventionalism cluster will be 
relatively closely related to the fundamentalism element, and will therefore also rise, so the 
measure of homosexual prejudice and other attitude measures within the conventionalism 
section of the scale are expected to rise also, again by a smaller amount (iii).  If the 
conventionalism component of RWA is increasing, but the overall RWA score is held 
constant in the regression, then the other components of RWA (authoritarian submission and 
authoritarian aggression) must, on average, decrease (iv).  Altemeyer (1996) has argued that 
the authoritarian aggression component of RWA is particularly associated with racial 
prejudice.  For this reason, we argue that if the aggression component of RWA decreases (to 
control statistically for ‘constant’ RWA while measuring increasing conventionalism) it 
would be expected that racial prejudice would also fall (v). In short, whatever the underlying 
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relationship is between fundamentalism and racial prejudice, this will be artificially reduced 
and even possibly made negative when holding RWA constant, purely as an artefact of the 
presence of fundamentalism as a component of RWA.  We argue that these problems impact 
upon any interpretation of a statistical relationship in which RWA is partialled out of a 
fundamentalism-prejudice relationship (e.g., Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Laythe et 
al. 2002; Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Rowatt et al. 2006; Wylie and Forest 1992).   
One solution to the problems we raise above would be to decompose RWA into its three 
subscales and directly address alternative models for how these constructs relate to each other, 
to religiosity, and to prejudice.  However, the historical construction of the RWA scale with 
multi-component items, and wording direction issues, has made this difficult in the past. 
Measuring Components of RWA 
There has been debate about the underlying factor structure of RWA and whether it is, 
in fact, possible to derive sufficiently independent measures of the three proposed 
components.  Some researchers have recognised the theoretical importance of distinguishing 
the components, and have derived subscales on face validity grounds (Duncan, Peterson, and 
Winter 1997; Smith and Winter 2002; Wink, Dillon, and Prettyman 2007).  Other researchers 
have used confirmatory factor analysis to derive short forms for each component (Funke 
2005; Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio, and Canova 2007) and it has recently been shown that a 
three-factor solution can be derived for the full 30-item RWA (Altemeyer 1996) scale 
(Mavor, Louis, and Sibley 2010). 
Altemeyer (1996) has used several statistical and conceptual arguments to suggest that 
the RWA scale should be treated as unidimensional.  He argued that RWA conceptually 
represents the covariation of the three clusters and as a result several of the items in the scale 
deliberately tap into multiple components making simple structure solutions in traditional 
exploratory factor analysis difficult.  Furthermore, since the scale is theorised as 
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unidimensional, it was considered sufficient to have a balance of positively worded (pro-trait) 
and reverse-coded (con-trait) items in the overall scale.  When two factors sometimes emerge 
in exploratory factor analyses, they usually align with pro- and con-trait worded items and 
Altemeyer suggests this is just an artefact of item wording.  However, item wording is 
confounded with the underlying component structure such that aggression items are more 
often pro-trait worded (agree responses represent higher authoritarianism) and 
conventionalism items are more often con-trait worded (agree responses represent lower 
authoritarianism (Funke 2005). This confound has obscured the issue of subscale structure of 
RWA but has been addressed in two complementary ways. 
Funke (2005) approached both the complex structure of some items and the wording 
direction confound by constructing new items to balance wording within subscales and 
remove or reword items with a complex subscale structure.  This provided researchers with a 
new shorter (12 item) scale based on RWA that measured all three components with balanced 
wording.  Mavor and colleagues recently argued that the full scale also supports a correlated 
three-factor solution over the traditional unidimensional interpretation (Mavor, Louis, and 
Sibley 2010).  There is now strong evidence from these studies that RWA can be 
conceptualised and measured as three components, although researchers still face the choice 
of which solution should be adopted if they include an RWA measure in their study.  
Reconsidering the Impact of RWA and Fundamentalism on Prejudice 
We have argued that the complex nature of the RWA scale can create misleading results 
when researchers in the psychology or religion use RWA alongside religiosity measures to 
predict various prejudices and other social attitudes.  These arguments suggest that it is 
appropriate to revisit the findings from Laythe and colleagues (2001, 2002), for example, that 
fundamentalism could lead to reduction in racial prejudice after RWA is controlled.  If we 
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find support for our arguments in the original data, then we can be confident that the issues 
we raise are generalisable and are not restricted to particular scales or historical contexts.   
The analyses presented below are based on the original item-level data from Laythe and 
colleagues (2002).  As well as the full scales for RWA, fundamentalism, homosexual 
prejudice and racial prejudice, this data set also included a measure of Christian orthodoxy, as 
Laythe and colleagues proposed a two-component model of fundamentalism based on both 
authoritarian and orthodoxy.  By using this data set we can revisit whether fundamentalism 
would lead to decreased racism after controlling for authoritarianism (Laythe et al. 2001), and 
explore whether a revised approach to the components of RWA would affect a two-
component model of fundamentalism (Laythe et al. 2002).  
To explore the issues we have raised here, we will present a series of analyses as 
follows: (1) We reconsider the factor analysis of the RWA scale to see if a two- or three-
factor model is plausible in the dataset using the 1992 version of the RWA scale commonly 
used in studies of religion and prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe et al. 
2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Rowatt and Franklin 2004); (2) We present the 
correlations between the RWA components and the other variables in the study; which then 
form the basis for (3) a set of parallel regressions to see if reducing the overlapping method 
variance between RWA and fundamentalism or orthodoxy changes the outcome from that 
previously reported.  These analyses will test our main statistical argument about the 
problems in using the full RWA scale and illustrate problems with the current construct 
definition of RWA.  We then (4) revisit the original analyses from Laythe and colleagues 
(2002) regarding the relationship between fundamentalism, authoritarianism and orthodoxy 
but based on the separate components of RWA as argued here.   
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METHOD 
Participants 
A total sample of 318 (118 Men, 195 Women, 5 unknown) participated in the original 
study. The full details are reported in Laythe and colleagues (2002).   
Measures 
The measures used by Laythe and colleagues (2002) were drawn from two studies 
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Fullerton and Hunsberger 1982). The scales used were 
RWA (30 items), Religious Fundamentalism (RF; 20 items); Christian Orthodoxy (CO; 24 
items); an adaptation of the Manitoba Prejudice scale to measure racial prejudice (RP; 19 
items), and an Attitudes toward Homosexuals scale to measure homosexual prejudice (HP; 12 
items).     
RESULTS 
Factor Analysis of RWA 
The RWA items were examined using a principal axis factoring method of factor 
extraction, and a Promax rotation method.  Of six eigenvalues >1, the first four were 8.6, 3.4, 
1.4, and 1.2. Two- or three-factor solutions were indicated according to interpretation of the 
scree plot.  For completeness we also considered a four-factor solution.  Both two- and three-
factor solutions were interpretable.  The fourth factor did not have any loadings above .4 and 
did not correlate with any of the other factors, so was not a viable factor in this context. 
In both the two- and three-factor solutions, the first factor was clearly interpretable as 
containing primarily aggression with some submission items.  The second factor in both 
solutions clearly represented the conventionalism component.  In the three-factor solution, the 
third factor was interpretable as primarily the con-trait worded submission items (See Table 1 
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for the two- and three-factor solutions). For our purposes here, the crucial distinction is 
between conventionalism and the other components of the scale (aggression and submission), 
and the top-loading items in the first two factors capture this adequately. In the analyses 
below, then, we distinguish an aggression/submission factor and a conventionalism factor.  
Submission items from the third factor were not included, nor any items where there was a 
cross loading which would be problematic for interpretation. That is, we included all items 
that loaded >.4 on the main aggression/submission factor and did not have a cross loading 
above .25 on the conventionalism factor, and vice versa (See Table 1). We compute the 
traditional full RWA score (RWAFull), consisting of all the RWA items, reversed as 
appropriate. The RWAAgg/Sub scale included 13 items with 8 items tapping aggression and 5 
tapping submission.  The RWAConv scale was computed from nine items. The conventionalism 
scales were computed with reversed items such that higher scores on conventionalism are 
consistent with higher RWA. 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
Correlation and Regression Analyses with RWA and Fundamentalism 
Overview 
To demonstrate the problems arising in regression analyses that include fundamentalism 
and the full RWA scale we will consider several forms of evidence.  We first examine the 
scale correlation matrix.  Evidence of our concern will show as higher correlations between 
RWA conventionalism and fundamentalism, than between the two RWA components, and as 
different patterns of correlations of the two RWA components with the criterion variables.  
These correlation patterns will be further explored in parallel sets of regressions.  In each set 
of regression analyses we consider first the model with the full RWA scale and 
fundamentalism predicting the criterion measures, followed by a parallel analysis with the 
RWA aggression/submission scale and fundamentalism.  Our argument will be supported if 
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the second set of analyses in the pair substantively changes the pattern of beta weights in the 
regression, with only minimal change in the overall prediction (variance accounted for).  This 
pattern would show that the path weights in the original regression are distorted by the 
inflated correlation between RWA and fundamentalism due to the presence of the 
conventionalism factor within RWA.  We also expect that these changes in path weights will 
be sufficient to undermine the conclusion that fundamentalism leads to reduced racial 
prejudice after controlling for RWA (Laythe et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 
2001), and also will reverse the pattern for homosexual prejudice such that fundamentalism 
will be a stronger predictor than RWA. 
Correlations 
The correlation matrix shows strong support for our arguments (see Table 2).  The 
correlations between RWA conventionalism and both fundamentalism and orthodoxy are 
stronger than that between conventionalism and the aggression/submission component, 
undermining use of the full RWA scale and fundamentalism (or orthodoxy) together as 
distinct variables. (Note 1) The two component measures of RWA also have distinct 
relationships with the two criterion measures.  Aggression/submission correlates strongly with 
both homosexual and racial prejudice, whereas conventionalism correlates strongly with 
homosexual prejudice but not racial prejudice.  However, both RWA components correlate 
equally strongly (about .8) with the full scale RWA measure, which is about as high as their 
respective reliabilities allow.  The same evidence of construct contamination found by Mavor 
and colleagues (2009) based on short RWA subscales in an independent data set is thus 
replicated here, in analyses of the full-length scales in the original Laythe et al. (2002) data. 
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
17 
RWA with fundamentalism predicting prejudice components 
In the following pair of regressions, we consider first the full RWA scale and then the 
effect of removing the conventionalism cluster and including only the aggression/submission 
component along with fundamentalism.  The analyses are summarized in Figure 2.  We 
present the results of the regression analyses as path models, so that the inter-correlations 
among the independent variables are shown alongside the beta coefficients measuring the 
relationship with the dependent measures. 
---- Insert Figure 2 about here ---- 
Considering first the prediction of racial prejudice from fundamentalism and the full 
RWA scale (see Figure 2, left side of panel a), we see that we replicate the general pattern 
found by Laythe and colleagues previously (Laythe et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and 
Kirkpatrick 2001), such that fundamentalism has a negative path weight for racial prejudice (-
.28).  However, when we remove the conventionalism component of RWA and predict racial 
prejudice from fundamentalism and RWA aggression/submission, we find several changes 
that support our argument (see Figure 2, right side of panel a); (1) the beta weight for 
fundamentalism is considerably reduced, dropping to a non-significant value (-.09), (2) the 
correlation between the predictors drops from .72 to .46 (a reduction in overlapping variance 
of 31% from 52% to 21%), and yet (3) the prediction of racial prejudice actually increases by 
4.5%.  We argue that removing the conventionalism items from the RWA scale actually 
improves the prediction of racial prejudice because it is the aggression component of RWA 
that is most associated with prejudice (Altemeyer 1996).  Using a measure of authoritarian 
aggression specifically may often allow the relationship with racial prejudice to become 
clearer.   
Considering the pair of regression analyses predicting homosexual prejudice from 
fundamentalism and RWA, the patterns are also in line with our argument.  When predicting 
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homosexual prejudice from fundamentalism and the full RWA scale, both predictors have 
positive beta weights (each is associated with increasing homosexual prejudice), but 
fundamentalism is the weaker predictor (.19. vs. 43).  When including only fundamentalism 
and RWA aggression/submission in the regression, both beta weights remain positive but the 
relative strength of prediction reverses; fundamentalism becomes the stronger predictor (.37 
vs. .29).  When RWA includes the conventionalism cluster, RWA appears to be a stronger 
predictor because conventionalism includes fundamentalism and homosexual prejudice 
already.  Once this confound is removed, fundamentalism is seen as the stronger predictor.  
As with racial prejudice, in spite of the substantial (31%) drop in shared method variance 
once conventionalism is removed, the overall prediction remains essentially the same 
(dropping by only 2.5% in this case). (Note 2) 
Extending the prejudice measures 
It has become common to focus on racial and homosexual prejudice in studies of this 
kind (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Herek 1987; Hunsberger 1995; Laythe et al. 
2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Rowatt et al. 2006; 
Wylie and Forest 1992) as indicators of proscribed and non-proscribed prejudice respectively 
(Batson, Shoenrade, and Ventis 1993).  The patterns of correlation with these two variables 
are commonly different, particularly with religiosity variables such as fundamentalism, as 
shown here.  However there is also substantial shared variance between these two measures 
(.54 here, and around .5 is common).   
Some studies using a larger number of criterion variables have explicitly created a 
generalized prejudice measure from the shared variance (Kirkpatrick 1993; McFarland 1989; 
Mavor and Gallois 2008). In particular, Mavor and Gallois show that homosexual prejudice 
can be explicitly modelled as a composite of group-based prejudice shared with racial 
prejudice measures, and a moral orientation component.  By decomposing homosexual 
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prejudice in this way it is possible to examine the proscribed and non-proscribed components 
of homosexual prejudice, which might be broadly seen as aligning with the maxim of “loving 
the sinner but hating the sin” (Fulton, Gorsuch, and Maynard 1999; Mak and Tsang 2008) and 
with the distinction between attitudes to homosexual behaviour versus civil rights (Kite and 
Whitley 1996).  To allow this more nuanced description of the data we computed a shared 
prejudice measure based on the first principal component of the two prejudice measures, and 
then computed the residual on the homosexual prejudice measure after removing this shared 
component.  Based on Mavor and Gallois (2008) we argue that the homosexual prejudice 
residual is an indicator of the moral judgement aspect of the homosexual prejudice measure. 
The analyses that follow therefore are based on four criterion variables that partition the 
variance in slightly different ways.  They are racial prejudice , shared or generalized 
prejudice, homosexual prejudice, and the residual of homosexual prejudice, which we will 
call moral judgement.  By creating these distinctions we can examine in particular whether 
the effects of orthodoxy, fundamentalism and RWAAgg/Sub on homosexual prejudice are based 
on the shared proscription of prejudices or the more normatively acceptable expression of 
moral judgement.  
Extended regression analyses 
To explore the more nuanced associations between these variables we conducted a 
series of regression analyses on each of the four criterion variables.  The first set of analyses 
replicates the analyses previously conducted for fundamentalism and RWA as shown in 
Figure 2, but extended to the additional criterion variables for completeness (See Table 3, 
panel 1).  We repeat the same approach using orthodoxy and RWA to see if the overlap in 
variance with RWAConv creates the same problematic pattern for orthodoxy (See Table 3, 
panel 2) and we examine two more complex analyses with RWA, fundamentalism and 
orthodoxy in the same regressions (See Table 3, panel 3).   
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---- Insert Table 3 about here ---- 
RWA and fundamentalism 
Extending the analysis shown in Figure 2 to include the new component variables 
(Table 3, panel 1) gives some sense of the range of the artefact phenomenon we discuss here.  
The differences in the beta weights for fundamentalism between the two analyses are most 
clear for those variables involving some level of group-based prejudice.  For racial, 
generalized, and homosexual prejudice, the effect of including RWAAgg/Sub in the equation in 
place of RWAFull changes the beta weight by .18-.21 in the direction of less negativity or more 
positivity.  For the more pure moral judgement variable which partials out the shared group 
prejudice elements from homosexual prejudice, the beta weight for fundamentalism is 
strongly positive and changes by only .02 between the two analyses.  This demonstrates the 
specificity of the effect and supports the view that the changes in beta weights are due to the 
problematic construct validity of RWA rather than being a simple consequence of high 
correlations between RWA and fundamentalism per se.  The effect of fundamentalism on 
prejudice generally can be seen most clearly for generalised prejudice where the beta changes 
from a non-significant negative relationship to a significant positive relationship. 
RWA and orthodoxy 
The pattern for orthodoxy shown in Table 3, panel 2 is similar to that shown for 
fundamentalism, but where all the beta values are shifted in a less prejudiced direction 
compared to fundamentalism.  After removing the problematic overlapping variance in RWA, 
the beta weights for orthodoxy shift in the direction of more prejudice but in absolute terms 
still show some tendency for reduced prejudice.  For generalized prejudice, the negative beta 
weight changes from a significant -.31 to a non-significant -.10.  When the criterion variables 
include a moral judgement component however orthodoxy predicts greater prejudice which is 
shown most clearly on the moral judgement variable (β = .23, p<.001).  As with 
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fundamentalism, the effect of removing the overlapping variance is most striking for criterion 
variables with some group prejudice component (.16 - .22) such that the apparent prejudice-
reducing effect of orthodoxy is partially undermined.  The effect on the moral judgement 
variable is a considerably smaller change in beta of .05. 
RWA, fundamentalism and orthodoxy 
Based on the two-component model of fundamentalism proposed by Laythe and 
colleagues (2002), we entered the combination of RWA, fundamentalism and orthodoxy into 
a series of regressions for each criterion variable.  The top part of Table 3, panel 3 shows the 
results when using the full RWA scale and the bottom part of the panel shows the equivalent 
results when RWAAgg/Sub is substituted.  As with the analyses reported above, the effect of 
reducing the artefactual overlap in variance is to shift the beta weights for both 
fundamentalism and orthodoxy in the direction of more prejudice such that the prejudice-
reducing effect is partially undermined in the case of orthodoxy and the effect is reduced or 
reversed for fundamentalism.  The pattern of change in beta is still quite strong for 
fundamentalism which changes of .18 - .20 toward prejudice, but smaller for orthodoxy, with 
changes of .06 - .09.   
In the case of homosexual prejudice, the primacy of RWA and fundamentalism as 
predictors reverses.  The full RWA scale appears to be the dominant predictor of homosexual 
prejudice, but when the overlap is removed fundamentalism emerges as the main predictor of 
homosexual prejudice.  The reason for this can be seen in the fourth column because 
fundamentalism has a strong association with the moral judgement component, whereas 
RWAAgg/Sub has the stronger impact on group prejudices. 
Inclusion of the additional criterion variables also clarifies the findings somewhat.  
Although orthodoxy shows a largely consistent effect in the direction of prejudice reduction 
for all the components involving some group-based prejudice (racial, generalized, and 
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homosexual prejudice), fundamentalism beta weights vary quite a lot depending on the nature 
of the prejudice. Only for the racial prejudice measure is there a non-significant trend toward 
reduced prejudice when controlling for full RWA.  When using RWAAgg/Sub in the equation, 
the betas for fundamentalism range from a non-significant positive association for racial 
prejudice (.05) to significant positive associations for generalized prejudice (.31) and 
homosexual prejudice (.49).  Thus the broad pattern of the two-component model of 
fundamentalism is supported (Laythe et al., 2002), but although orthodoxy does seem to 
function as the prejudice-reducing component of fundamentalism, the RWA component is not 
sufficient to explain the prejudice-increasing component of fundamentalism (even when we 
focus this component on the aspect of RWA most clearly associated with prejudice). 
DISCUSSION 
We have shown that the issues raised in the present paper concerning the structure of 
RWA and the overlap with other measures of interest do indeed cause problems in 
interpretation for researchers in this domain.  The central issue is the problematic construct 
definition of RWA.  Consistent with the growing trend in recent work (Duckitt and Fisher 
2003; Duncan, Peterson, and Winter 1997; Funke 2005; Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio, and 
Canova 2007; LaBouff et al. 2010; Mavor, Louis, and Sibley 2010; Mavor et al. 2009; Smith 
and Winter 2002) we show that the Altemeyer and Hunberger (1992) RWA scale, used by 
many researchers in the social psychology of religion, can be divided into distinguishable 
factors.  Not only are these factors interpretable, they have very different relationships with 
other criterion variables.  Indeed, we show here that the two components of RWA have 
stronger correlations with distinct criterion variables than they do with each other.  The 
conventionalism component has stronger correlations with fundamentalism, orthodoxy and 
homosexual prejudice than it does with RWA aggression/submission.  Similarly, the RWA 
aggression/submission component has stronger correlations with both racial and homosexual 
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prejudice than it does with conventionalism.  Such findings undermine the construct validity 
of RWA as a unidimensional scale and support the discriminant validity of at least two 
components. 
We have also demonstrated, in the present paper, the nefarious consequences of 
assuming RWA as a unitary construct in regression involving these other variables of interest.  
As we predicted, regressions involving the full RWA scale and either fundamentalism or 
orthodoxy are distorted by the overlapping variance among the independent variables.  When 
the problematic overlapping variance is removed by using RWA aggression/submission in the 
regression instead of the whole scale, the effect is to reduce (for orthodoxy) or eliminate (for 
fundamentalism) the apparent beneficial effects of religiosity leading to reduced prejudice.  In 
regressions involving fundamentalism and RWA, when the conventionalism component was 
removed, leading to a reduction in the overlapping variance between predictors, the degree of 
prediction of the criterion variable remained essentially the same, or even increased slightly.   
These changes have important implications for research on the relationship between 
forms of religiosity and prejudice.  Previous evidence supported the view that fundamentalism 
could be associated with reduced prejudice once authoritarianism was controlled. This was 
supported in a recent meta-analysis (Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010) which found an estimated 
parameter value over 8 studies of -.12 for fundamentalism and prejudice with RWA 
controlled, with a confidence interval of [-.19 , -.04].  The evidence here suggests that at best 
this effect is not a significant one but in many cases fundamentalism will be significantly 
associated with prejudice even after controlling for the component of RWA that is most 
associated with prejudice.  The effect is to consistently alter the beta weights for 
fundamentalism in the direction of more prejudice.  The difference in the betas reported here 
is around .2 and in other studies has been higher (.34 difference for racial prejudice in Mavor 
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et al., 2009).  These differences would completely undermine and might even reverse the 
conclusion in a meta-analysis.  Such a finding is quite significant. 
Similarly, although the differences are slightly smaller for orthodoxy, the change is 
sufficient to be worth accounting for in any future meta-analyses.  Based on currently 
published research we believe that the effect of orthodoxy on reducing prejudice (with RWA 
controlled) is likely to be over-estimated.   
We have also demonstrated here the value of exploring a wider range of criterion 
measures and attempting to disentangle the associations between different prejudices.  While 
racial and homosexual prejudice may act broadly as indicators of proscribed and non-
proscribed prejudices respectively, we have shown that it is possible to disentangle these 
effects in a more nuanced way by examining also the effects on a generalized prejudice 
composite and examining the moral judgement component of homosexual prejudice 
separately.  Although we have adopted a simple approach to this here based on only two 
original measures, the method adopted by Mavor and Gallois (2008) based on a larger number 
of criterion measures is likely to be even more fruitful in future studies. 
Understanding the “artefact” 
We have made several strong claims here: that the paradoxical suppression effect 
whereby fundamentalism seems to be associated with reduced racial prejudice, and that RWA 
seems to be a stronger predictor of homosexual prejudice than fundamentalism, are both 
consequences of a statistical artefact in these regression analyses.  We further claim that a 
similar but weaker pattern emerges with orthodoxy when RWA is controlled.  It is important 
to be clear about what features may or may not be signs of this artefact in operation.  
Moderate to high correlations between the IV’s are not in themselves sufficient to explain 
these effects, though we argue that it is a good indicator that further examination is 
worthwhile.  Higher correlations between some IV’s than between those IV’s and the criterion 
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variables are likely to create the defining conditions for suppression and under these 
circumstances it is worth explicitly considering the first-order partial correlation between the 
IV’s controlling for each criterion variable in turn.  If the variance shared in common between 
the IV’s that is unrelated to the criterion variable is greater than the variance shared by the 
IV’s with the criterion then a suppression effect will occur (see the explanation in Maassen 
and Bakker 2001; Mavor et al. 2009).  The presence of a suppression effect is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to show the artefact we explore here, but it is a good indicator that 
careful attention is required.  Paradoxical suppression relationships can be meaningful and 
interesting theoretical findings and should not be rejected out of hand, but we hope that 
researchers will now consider the alternative hypotheses of the kind we present her before 
drawing confident conclusions. 
We have made a strong case that the RWA – fundamentalism – prejudice relationship is 
subject to artefact because several conditions have been met: (1) RWA has been shown to 
have distinguishable components in this context (such that relationships between the 
components are weaker than with external variables) (2) The strong relationship between one 
of the components (conventionalism) and other variables of interest is artificially inflated by 
method variance.  The consequence is an artificial shift in the beta weights for the other IV 
(e.g. fundamentalism) that can have a variety of consequences depending on the underlying 
zero-order correlations.  We hope that researchers will consider the possibility of these 
circumstances when they find paradoxical suppression effects (as with fundamentalism and 
racial prejudice here), but that they will also think more broadly about the dimensionality of 
focal constructs in the domain of interest.   
Contextual Changes in RWA and the RWA-Prejudice Relationship 
We have focused our attention largely on the consequences of challenges to the validity 
of RWA as a unitary construct and have argued that the accumulated evidence now supports 
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both the discriminant validity of multiple components within RWA; and the interpretational 
necessity of treating it as multi-dimensional, particularly in the context of religiosity and 
prejudice.  In addition, recent research on contextual changes in RWA and the RWA-
prejudice relationship is also relevant to researchers in religiosity, and our arguments equally 
apply to this new contextually-oriented research. 
RWA is often considered sufficiently stable to call a personality variable, and at the 
very least it is usually assumed to be a stable individual difference measure (Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger 1992; Laythe et al. 2002; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Rowatt and 
Franklin 2004; Rowatt et al. 2006).  However several recent lines of work have challenged the 
normative stability of RWA across time and contexts (Lehmiller and Schmitt 2008; Lehmiller 
and Schmitt 2007; Louis, Mavor, and Terry 2003; Reynolds et al. 2001; Verkuyten and 
Hagendoorn 1998).  These studies suggest that RWA may not be acting as a dispositional 
individual difference, and that the consistency found in many studies may result from relative 
stability on the overall political context at the time.   
Taking this approach, Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) developed a group 
authoritarianism measure based on Duckitt’s (1989, 1992) reconceptualization of RWA as a 
group-level phenomenon.  Duckitt argued that RWA could be seen as a response to group-
level threats and that the three components of RWA could be thought of as three forms of 
reaction to threat; intolerance of deviance (aggression), obedience to leaders (submission), 
and conformity to norms (conventionalism).  The Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) data are 
consistent with this interpretation.  Taken together, this line of research suggests that RWA 
and its relationship to other variables are conditional upon the broader social context 
(particularly group threat), the particular identity that is made salient for the participants, and 
their degree of commitment to that identity in addition to any underlying disposition. 
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All of the studies which have focused on contextual variability in RWA-prejudice 
relationships have assumed the traditional unitary view of RWA.  Accordingly, there is room 
for further development of a contextual threat model of RWA in the light of the emerging 
evidence that the underlying components can be separately measured.  It is not yet clear 
which components of RWA are most susceptible to contextual variation, and the inconsistent 
use of RWA scale variations in these studies makes it difficult to anticipate what might be 
found.  However, it seems likely that when religious contexts are made salient, and when 
religious identity is strong, conventionalism as currently measured is likely to increase 
significantly.  While the wording of many RWA aggression items implies a national context, 
if we are interested in the role of religiosity it maybe appropriate to pursue a group 
authoritarianism line of research in a specifically religious group context.   
RWA: Boon or Bane? 
Researchers have embraced the use of RWA because it has strong predictive power for 
a variety of attitudes (e.g., Duckitt 2006; Heaven and St. Quinton 2003; Haslam and Levy 
2006; Peterson, Doty, and Winter 1993).  Moreover, RWA has interesting connections to 
other religiosity measures such as fundamentalism that intrigue researchers in the study of 
prejudice and religion (e.g., Duck and Hunsberger 1999; Hunsberger 1995; Laythe, Finkel, 
and Kirkpatrick 2001; Rowatt and Franklin 2004).  However, the arguments that we present 
here challenge the use of RWA in this context. RWA, as it currently stands, is not compatible 
with research questions concerning the question of when religiosity is linked to prejudice.  As 
it is currently defined, RWA explains the relationship between fundamentalism and negative 
attitudes to homosexuality, for example, as multiple indicators of the common causal 
construct, conventionalism.  In turn, conventionalism is tied to the overall RWA construct, so 
that conventionalism, aggression and submission are all multiple indicators of an underlying 
construct of authoritarianism.  This model is incompatible with an alternative model that sees 
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attitudes to homosexuality as a causal outcome of fundamentalist belief.  Both models are, of 
course, plausible, but they are nonetheless mutually inconsistent, and the relative implications 
of the competing models are effectively untestable using the overall RWA construct.   
Unfortunately, this has previously placed researchers in the social psychology of 
prejudice in a Catch-22 position in terms of measurement of RWA in their studies.  
Altemeyer (1996, 2007) strongly opposes the use of anything short of the full RWA scale in 
research, reserving a special hell full of “badly played banjo music” for researchers who 
“chop up” his “carefully developed instrument” (Altemeyer 2007 p 36 note 3).  We agree that 
to use arbitrarily selected items from a scale without due thought to construct validity 
concerns is unwise and pernicious.  However, researchers who do use the full RWA scale, 
along with fundamentalism, to predict any of a range of social attitudes of interest, will also 
run headlong into the alternative construct validity problems we have raised here.  This 
effectively makes it impossible to explore key questions of religion and of prejudice while 
using the full RWA scale.   
The present paper extends concerns previously raised about measurement processes 
(Gorsuch 1984) and conceptually problematic constructs in the psychology of religion 
(Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990).  We believe that RWA has, so far, been more of a bane than a 
boon to the study of religion and prejudice, and has prevented the development of alternative 
models in the social psychology of religion.  Our central argument is that correlational 
analyses, including multiple regression and structural equation modelling, presume a correctly 
specified model which is effectively impossible when including RWA and other constructs of 
interest in this domain such as fundamentalism.  We argue that within the social psychology 
of religion, artefactual suppressor effects created by measurement overlap are routinely 
wrongly interpreted. This fundamental issue arises whenever RWA and other inter-correlated 
‘conventional’ social attitudes such as fundamentalism are jointly considered as ‘independent’ 
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variables in analyses such as multiple regression and structural equation modelling.  In 
addition we cite a growing literature pointing to the need to reconceptualise RWA to take into 
account processes of intergroup relations and social identity rather than simply assuming 
authoritarianism to be a dispositional construct. 
For the purposes of eliminating the main statistical (and some of the conceptual) 
problems we have raised here, it is the conventionalism cluster that is the culprit.  Simply 
leaving that cluster out of the analysis will often improve the validity of the outcome, but 
generally we would recommend just using the RWA aggression subscale when possible.  
Researchers using the 1996 version of the RWA scale may be guided by the factor analysis 
findings of Mavor and colleagues (2010) in deciding which items to include.  The aggression 
subscale is theorized to have the strongest relationship with prejudice, so if the goal is to 
control for RWA as an alternative explanation for prejudice, use of the aggression subscale 
may actually increase prediction as it did here in several cases.  Researchers should report 
their primary results for an analysis that measures RWA in terms of aggression/submission 
items only.  For comparison, full RWA scale results may be footnoted or included in the text 
as well.  However, researchers should explicitly note, we believe, that negative suppression 
effects due to the use of the full RWA scale with other inter-correlated independent variables 
should not necessarily be interpreted as meaningful.  They may arise as statistical artefacts of 
the inclusion of items tapping those other independent variables within the RWA scale itself.  
Finally, many researchers may also find it theoretically interesting to consider 
alternative models where the conventionalism cluster, or the items which form part of it, are 
considered as outcome variables of authoritarian aggression or submission not simply as 
construct defining covariates.  For example, authoritarian aggression and submission may 
cause fundamentalism, and through this variable be linked indirectly as well as directly to 
homophobia, sexism, or other forms of prejudice.  The explanatory power of these and other 
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causal models disentangling fundamentalism from RWA remains to be tested in empirical 
research. 
Conclusions 
We have presented here a number of critiques of using right-wing authoritarianism 
(conceptualised as a single dimension incorporating aggression, submission, and 
conventionalism) in research concerning the link between religiosity and prejudice. We 
believe that past conclusions drawn from some research using RWA in this domain are 
suspect, and that RWA will remain of questionable value in this important area of research 
until these concerns are addressed.   
However, there are clearly useful insights to be gained from the extensive 
authoritarianism research tradition that should not be discarded in the process.  We encourage 
efforts to improve the measurement of distinct components of authoritarianism that could be 
used to test various alternative models.  Until the underlying conceptual models have been 
made more explicit, and the measures we use mirror those models in a sufficiently nuanced 
manner, there is a grave danger that statistical artefacts may be wrongly interpreted to 
contaminate the evolution of the field.   
The last decade has reminded us that a fundamental research question in the scientific 
study of religion remains as central as ever.  As new forms of religious political mobilization 
and terrorism emerge in the 21st century, understanding the paradoxical relationships between 
religiosity, prejudice, and social conflict is vitally important.  At the moment RWA represents 
a bane to researchers in this important area, hiding or distorting relationships of interest.  It 
still has the potential to be a boon in the future if researchers in the RWA domain develop 
commonly accepted measures of the three component elements within the construct, relieving 
religiosity researchers of the double-bind in which they currently find themselves.  In the 
meantime, we hope that researchers will take seriously the concerns we have raised here and 
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do their best to avoid the inherent conceptual and statistical traps when including current 
forms of the full RWA scale in research programs.  With those admonitions and cautions in 
mind, RWA may yet prove a useful construct in understanding the nature of religiosity and 
social attitudes such as prejudice. 
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Notes 
1. Following Mavor et al, 2009, we also carried out several large factor analyses with 
combinations of orthodoxy, fundamentalism and authoritarianism items to see if the 
RWA scale held together at the item level.  Conventionalism items fell in the same 
factors with orthodoxy and fundamentalism items, but in distinct factors from the 
aggression/submission items. This is consistent with the findings of Mavor et al., and 
is a further challenge to the construct validity of RWA in this context. 
2. In response to a reviewer’s suggestion we checked to make sure that the same pattern 
would hold when excluding the 8 items that were not used in either of the subscales 
reported here.  We computed a version of the full RWA scale based only on the 13 
aggression/submission items and the nine conventionalism items and ran the 
equivalent regressions to those reported on the left side of Figure 1.  The pattern of 
beta weights changed by less than .02 and hence the interpretation would be the same.  
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Table 1: Two and three factor solutions for the 1992 RWA scale 
RWA Item Item 
# Two Factor  Three Factor Scale 
  F1 F2  F1 F2 F3  
The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be 
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. 22 0.802 -0.094  0.779 -0.108 0.05 AS 
Once our government leaders give us the "go ahead" it will be the duty of every 
patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from 
within. 14 0.696 -0.053  0.758 0.038 -0.19 AS 
Authorities, such as parents and our national leaders, generally turn out to be 
right about things, and the radicals and protestors are almost always wrong. 23 0.692 -0.099  0.665 -0.12 0.063 AS 
What our country really needs is a strong determined leader who will crush evil 
and take us back to our true path. 28 0.665 0.128  0.7 0.173 -0.088 AS 
Our country will be great if we honour the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining 
everything. 01 0.665 -0.033  0.657 -0.032 0.013 AS 
In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy especially when 
dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. 17 0.663 -0.181  0.655 -0.169 -0.007 AS 
What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights," is a good dose of 
law and order. 05 0.653 -0.065  0.572 -0.183 0.262 AS 
It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government 
and religion, than listen to noisy rabble-rousers in society who are trying to 
create doubt in people's minds. 03 0.634 0.014  0.591 -0.041 0.132 AS 
Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect 
our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done. 16 0.624 0.091  0.598 0.056 0.087 AS 
40 
Obedience is the most important virtue children should learn. 12 0.605 -0.024  0.643 0.037 -0.122 AS 
Some young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow older they 
ought to become more mature and forget such things. 19 0.521 0.034  0.511 0.025 0.031 AS 
The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show 
we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are 
going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order. 09 0.458 0.077  0.448 0.062 0.04 AS 
One reason we have so many troublemakers in our society nowadays is that 
parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical 
punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly. 30 0.42 0.11  0.438 0.132 -0.041 AS 
Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs. 06 0.414 0.26  0.434 0.273 -0.024  
The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the 
straight and narrow. 26 0.375 0.321  0.395 0.329 -0.017  
It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants. 11 0.318 0.168  0.182 -0.05 0.475  
There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 08 -0.161 0.752  -0.101 0.792 -0.09 C 
People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms 
of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what 
is moral and immoral. 04 -0.074 0.714  -0.052 0.69 0.035 C 
There is really nothing wrong with a lot of the things that people call "sins". 20 -0.027 0.676  0.009 0.679 -0.018 C 
A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs 
which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people 
follow. 24 0.016 0.665  0.04 0.649 0.022 C 
There is no "one right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 13 -0.133 0.662  -0.112 0.639 0.031 C 
Everyone should have his own lifestyle, religious beliefs and sexual preferences 
even if it makes him different from everyone else. 21 -0.065 0.659  -0.05 0.627 0.053 C 
There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody's being a homosexual. 10 0.138 0.587  0.185 0.617 -0.066 C 
There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 25 0.077 0.587  0.079 0.543 0.082 C 
Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no 18 0.047 0.572  -0.019 0.435 0.291 C 
41 
doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
It is wonderful that young people can protest anything they don't like, and act 
however they wish nowadays. 02 0.009 0.467  -0.079 0.309 0.342  
The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is head 
of the family, and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the 
better.  The old-fashioned way has a lot wrong with it. 07 0.052 0.394  0.048 0.358 0.07  
Students must be taught to challenge their parents' ways, confront the authorities, 
and criticise the traditions of our society. 29 0.007 0.392  -0.086 0.233 0.345  
We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since 
new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change. 27 0.158 0.385  -0.033 0.097 0.658  
Government, judges and the police should never be allowed to censor books. 15 0.207 0.299  0.131 0.168 0.284  
 
Notes:  
(1) Item numbers are from the version of the scale reported in Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). 
(2) AS = RWA aggression/submission scale; C = RWA conventionalism scale.  
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Table 2: Reliabilities and correlations for RWA, religiosity and prejudice variables. 
  Alpha 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Fundamentalism  .92 .58 .72 .46 .77 .15 .37 .50 .37 
2. Orthodoxy   .98 -- .49 .23 .62 -.09 .03 .15 .25 
3.RWA (Full)  .91  -- .84 .78 .39 .55 .57 .18 
4.RWA (Agg/Sub)  .89   -- .37 .48 .54 .46 -.03 
5.RWA (Conventionalism)  .87    -- .11 .36 .51 .41 
6.Racial Prejudice  .91     -- .88 .54 -.48 
7. Generalized Prejudice  --      -- .88 .00 
8. Homosexual Prejudice  .91       -- .48 
9. Moral Judgement  --        -- 
Note: To avoid cluttering the table we note that with N=318, r’s >=.12 are significant at p < .05;  r >= .15, p<.01; r >= .19, p<.001. 
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Table 3: Regressions of prejudice measures on fundamentalism, orthodoxy and RWA. 
  Racial 
Prejuice  
Generalized 
Prejudice  
Homosexual 
Prejudice  
Moral 
Judgement  
1 RWA and Fundamentalism 
 RWAFull .60 *** .58 *** .43 *** -.18 *   
 Fundamentalism -.28 *** -.05 .19 **  .50 *** 
 R2 .19 *** .30 *** .34 *** .15 *** 
 RWAAgg/Sub .53 *** .46 *** .29 *** -.25 *** 
 Fundamentalism -.09     .16 ** .37 *** .48 *** 
 R2 .24 *** .31 *** .32 *** .19 *** 
2 RWA and Orthodoxy     
 RWAFull .58 *** .70 *** .65 *** .08     
 Orthodoxy -.37 *** -.31 *** -.17 ** .22 ** 
 R2 .26 *** .37 *** .34 *** .26 *** 
 RWAAgg/Sub .53 *** .56 *** .45 *** -.09 
 Orthodoxy -.21 *** -.10  .05 .27 *** 
 R2 .28 *** .29 *** .21 *** .07 *** 
3 RWA, Fundamentalism and Orthodoxy 
 RWAFull  .65 *** .64 *** .47 *** -.19 * 
 Fundamentalism -.13 .11 .31 *** .46 *** 
 Orthodoxy -.34 *** -.34 *** -.26 *** .08 
 R2 .27 *** .38 *** .38 *** .16 *** 
 RWAAgg/Sub  .52 *** .45 *** .28 *** -.25 *** 
 Fundamentalism .05  .31 *** .49 *** .46 *** 
 Orthodoxy -.24 *** -.25 *** -.20 ** .05 
 R2 .28 *** .35 *** .34 *** .19 *** 
Notes: * <.05; ** <.01; *** <.001 
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Figure 1: Statistically artefactual relationships that arise from using RWA in multiple 
regression. 
 
Note:  Roman sequence (i-v) represents the expected consequences for racial prejudice.  The 
values given are purely illustrative. 
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Figure 2: Path weights for RWA and fundamentalism predicting racial prejudice (panel a) and 
homosexual prejudice (panel b). 
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